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Philosophy and Theory 
Jon Erickson 
A certain amount of what I say in the following is exaggerated for effect, but 
my experiences with the dynamics of theoretical fashion in academia that informs 
what I say is often less exaggerated than it would seem. 
In a conventional sense, the words philosophy and theory are entirely 
compatible, from Plato's theory of forms down to John Rawls's theory of justice. 
But th is is not what we're talking about when we refer to theory as synonym for 
"critical theory." Critical theory is an offshoot of Continental philosophy, starting 
with Hegel , radically reshaped by the suspicions of Marx and Nietzsche, abetted 
by the Freudian unconscious and removed from rational human will by the linguistic 
turn o f structuralism and poststructuralism. In this process it can become a 
disavowal of its philosophical beginnings, at times even an attack on them, and 
ultimately a forgetting (as is the most widespread use of "theory" in humanistic 
discipl ines that maintain only perfunctory and often antagonistic relations to 
philosophy or philosophy departments). 
In terms of its philosophical origins, one could say that critical theory must 
go b a c k to Kant for his development of a critical philosophy, that is, his concept of 
"cr i t ique," which in his sense meant a careful logical separation of the wheat from 
the chaf f in any particular conception of the world or experience. After Marx and 
Nietzsche, "critique" seems to imply the demolition of that which stands in your 
way. 1 This may be a bit simplistic, but that's how the word seems to be used for 
the m o s t part today. The purifying or refining concept of critique may still be 
operative in Adomo and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment, but it practically 
refines Enlightenment reason out of existence, conflating it with myth, and giving 
rise, a long with Foucault, to a simplistic anti-Enlightenment position prevalent in 
theory today. (Presumably Foucault made a "return" to Kant, as did Derrida and 
Lyotard—although in each case whether it is a reconsideration or a travesty needs 
to b e examined carefully). 2 
A further attack of theory on philosophical reason came with Derrida's attack 
on " logocentr ism" which appeared to claim that logic was always undermined by 
the impl ic i t rhetoricity of its terms. Despite the fact that Derrida's argument had to 
be a logical one to be convincing, and that his own position in this regard is not 
unequivocal, people in the humanities rejoiced in the sense of mastery they could 
now h a v e over their competitors in philosophy and the social sciences. Everything 
became ideology-oriented rhetorical analysis of the logical arguments of the 
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sciences, human and natural, and the bad old Sophists were revived over the now 
bad old Plato and Socrates. No one had to be worried about logic anymore— 
especially since "logocentrism" ("linearity" in argument, etc.) was typified as 
patriarchal oppression—but need only be suspicious about everything, and name 
the enemy where he be found (which was everywhere, of course). The persuasive 
force of logical argument became equated, through association with rhetorical 
regimes, with force per se, and the ad hominem guilt-by-association nature of 
identity politics was affirmed by this process. 
Philosophy has always reflected upon limits: the conditions of possibility for 
cognition, reason, judgment (Kant) as well as the limits of our experience and 
understanding. The phrase "one must be philosophical about it" represents just 
this knowing acceptance of fmitude, a modesty and graciousness to adapt to what, 
to our understanding, cannot be changed, while recognizing and acting upon, along 
the lines of moral consistency, what must be changed (reflecting the history of 
moral and political philosophy). Theory often appears to refuse these limits, 
wanting to believe that all of human existence and even the unconscious structures 
of one's own beliefs can be changed if the right material mode of analysis and 
method of application can be found. (This has given rise to the erroneous notion 
within some Marxist theory that there is no such thing as "human nature," a position, 
according to Norman Geras, Marx himself never held). Hence theory really begins 
with Marx's Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach: "Philosophy has only interpreted the 
world in various ways; the point is to change it." 
The presumption of many contemporary political academics is that to interpret 
the world in the right way is to change it. This may not be so far off, but it depends 
upon your overestimation of what academic discourse can do (in relation to the 
level of mass-cultural discourse of the media)—especially the rather phantasmatic 
appropriations of speech-act theory that are current. On the most mediated level, 
the world is changed by interpretations that gain mass appeal. Which is why the 
theatre, taken in its broadest sense, from resistant small performance in oppressive 
countries, to independent filmmaking to performance actions on the world wide 
web, can be seen as a locus for this question. The nature of the interpretation of 
the world, however, is another matter, for that is where the distinction between 
philosophy and theory returns. For theory will draw from philosophy (as Marx 
did from Hegel, or Foucault from Nietzsche) for its methodological and 
epistemological basis, but it must simplify it for common understanding in order 
to make it pragmatically and politically useful. The less capable it is of putting 
into comprehensible everyday language, the less useful it is politically: starkly 
evident in the contrast between the arcane locutions of poststructuralist political 
discourse and the ordinary language of Anglo-American political philosophy. In 
the process of refinement there is the danger of losing philosophy's sense of 
conceptual limits regarding the things made pragmatic. While much overly-refined 
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analysis has been made of Brecht's analytical method in the theatre (irrespective 
of real audiences), few ever comment on his notion of Plumpedenken, or "crude 
thinking," which he understands is necessary for political provocation; anything 
more refined would seem to work against the spectator's capacity for willed action 
through an inevitable process of aestheticization of complexity. At the same time 
the danger is that too crude a form of thinking can reduce the work to mere 
propaganda, in which critical thinking wouldn't have much of a role for either 
performers or spectators. 
Marx's dichotomy between interpreting and changing, of course, depend 
upon his own interpretation of change. That is, his replacement of implacable 
eternally repeating Nature with History, but also turning History into a kind o 
progressive Nature (his own self-identification with Darwin in this regard ironically 
makes him the first "Social Darwinist"!). This is the basis of so called "scientific 
Marxism" or historical materialism (which Brecht adhered to until the end, despite 
critical desires to turn him into a postmodernist). This is in contrast to Western 
"critical Marxism," such as that of the Frankfurt School, which rejected such 
teleological, if not eschatological views of history (see Alvin Gouldner, The Two 
Marxisms)? But such a rejection instigated a deep crisis in Marxist views of 
social history and revolution, and various compromise positions have tried to patch 
up this rift (such as Benjamin's concept of a "weak Messianic force"). Despite 
this conceptual crisis, whereby it is not really clear anymore what anyone in critical 
theory really means by "history" once it is seen as merely a chaotic concatenation 
of discontinuities, the consideration of historical contexts in their relative specificity 
has been a useful tool in critical theory's critique of philosophical discursive norms 
understood as universal and metaphysical. Thus one can always place philosophical 
theories within the material determinants of their historical context, (although it is 
highly presumptuous to believe one can reduce the theories to those determinants). 
But the irony is that in order to begin to "historicize" philosophy, one has to have 
a philosophy of history to start with. Which only demonstrates that you can 
his tor icize everything except the bases of your own thinking. Thus any 
"historicization" by theory is no defeat of philosophy, or even metaphysics, which 
is where we always start. 
I find it unfortunate that critical theory as it is generally applied to performance 
and cultural issues so often follows its own unreflected-upon rhetorical patterns 
and dogmatic appeals to authorities who everyone simply agrees with—the magic 
of invoking a relatively small number of the right names interminably repeated, 
with minor variations. I am sometimes tempted to say that the difference between 
philosophers and theorists is that philosophers make arguments, while theorists 
make assertions and call them arguments. (Mainly because no one requires them 
to make arguments, and now "performative writing" actually encourages the evasion 
of arguments). This is best seen in bad writing when someone says, "I am going to 
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argue that—", or "I am arguing that—" followed by his or her assertion, with no 
further demonstration forthcoming: saying you are arguing is a substitute for actual 
argument. When this happens, and especially in conference environments and 
publishing series, where the political line is predictable, arguments are replaced by 
interestingly-framed pieties, and suddenly we're in church. This is no more apparent 
than in titles like "Towards a Materialist Critique of . . . " Just the invocation of the 
term "materialist" inspires a kind of moralistic fervor, despite its political rejection 
of moral discourse. In fact I find that a theory that simply dismisses all moral 
questions as mere effects of political or ideological structures ends up expressing 
itself moralistically.4 And I'm always wondering who this materialist critique is 
aimed at: is its audience supposed to be idealists to be converted? fundamentalists? 
Where does one find an idealist in academia today? Who isn't a materialist? (besides 
myself—but I stand philosophically opposed to the binary no one wants to 
deconstruct: idealism/materialism). The audience is the already converted, and 
the argument is always "more anti-essentialist than thou," so the moralism of the 
more complex of materialist critiques is the doctrinal one of weeding out the less 
antimetaphysically committed, as well as advancing oneself careerwise (is this a 
materialist analysis?). Despite this tone that accompanies theorists' demands for a 
rigorous "materialist analysis of (fill in the blank)," materialism in and of itself 
cannot be the basis of any moral judgments or the moral basis of any politics 
whatsoever. Clearly some materialist methods give us a clearer sense of context 
from which we draw our evidence for judgments, but it does nothing to specify 
why our judgments should be one way or another. And this is a philosophical 
issue. Let me be clear: none of this is to deny the value, especially in regard to our 
analysis of the past, of materialist methods, which I myself have engaged, and are 
essential to the study of history. It is rather to ask: is the method being put to use 
because, in a given context, it can be pragmatically beneficial to human lives, or is 
it being used primarily to prove (actually: to assert) that something called 
"materialism" (and my version of it) is the only necessary and true approach to 
reality? I tend to think that the latter is the main concern in much theory today, 
even as it attempts to use demonstrations of the former to that end. In that sense it 
is less a critical theory than the refinement of a dogma disguised as one. Perhaps 
this signals the real difference: a critical philosophy is always ready to question its 
own assumptions: a critical theory is always ready to question everyone else's. 
What does philosophy or theory have to do with theatre or performance? 
Over the centuries, the idea of a theatrum mundi has informed not only western 
but some eastern conceptions of human existence. In the twentieth century a number 
of important sociologists, ethnologists, psychologists have found theatricality an 
important model for understanding human behavior in a wide variety of cultural 
contexts. But if we were to go back and consider the relation of Western theatre to 
its Greek beginnings, we could see where it might also fall between philosophy 
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and theory. 
If we make once more the connection between contemporary forms of theory 
and sophism (as techne, as the intellectual means to change the world through 
rhetoric) we know that sophism's rhetorical style and innovation of dialectics indeed 
had a large impact on the theatre, especially that of Euripides. On the other hand, 
insofar as tragedy is a cogitation on the limits of human rationality and will, and 
the social and personal dilemmas that arise therefrom, it is philosophical, especially 
in refusing to pretend to see any particular techne as adequate to all human situations. 
There is also another strain within theatre that reflects its philosophical 
beginnings as well, but also that carries within it the seeds of its own antitheatrical 
impulse, all the way up to Brecht, and that is a kind of irreducible Platonism of 
mimetic effects, both too real for some and not real enough for others. This remains 
with us despite all the various attempts to circumvent them practically or explain 
them away theoretically. 
The following are some arguments and problems bequeathed to us by the 
Greeks and their theatres (of Dionysos, of politics, of philosophy) that remain 
embedded—whether acknowledged or not—in our own discourses: political, moral, 
or theatrical: 
- the tension between Being and Non-Being 
- the tension between Being and Becoming 
- the tension between the One and the Many 
- the relation of and conflict between rhetorical effect and logical 
truth 
- the relation or tensions between monologue and dialogue 
- the question of mimesis and the real 
- the relation and conflict between the passions and reason 
- the question of self-knowledge and its limits with regard to 
will or agency 
So as not to appear entirely eurocentric in this, but with less confidence, I can 
point to philosophical questions worth considering from the East: 
- in Madhyamika Buddhism, the tetralemma of Nagarjuna, which 
makes the Western dialectic of Being and Non-Being, the real 
and unreal, look like child's play. Frame indeterminacy 
surpassing Pirandello. 5 
- in the Hindu scriptures, the very theatrical question of 
appearance and reality tied to the question of the One and the 
Many. 
- in Zen Buddhism the relation between desire (craving), illusion 
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and suffering, evident in the expressions of the Noh theatre. 
While it is no doubt clear that my preferences in this question, whose formative 
split may be problematic, is largely with philosophy, I also believe that a critical 
theory or more exactly, theories, are practical necessities in working toward social 
justice and the improvement of human life in society. Theories in this sense are 
the tools of certain philosophical positions, and are legitimated by them. Theories 
that try to disavow this practical relationship and attempt to escape it and make 
their own strategic formulations into an end-in-itself lose their own legitimating 
power provided by their philosophical grounds, and their key terms begin to ring 
hollow. (So my above criticisms of how I see "theory" being deployed today is not 
an attack on theory per se). As Gregory Vlastos put it in commenting on 
Democritus's ethics: "'Wisdom' is the understanding of what is possible within 
the limits of what is necessary." Theory will always remain naive and disaster-
bound insofar as it is philosophically deficient (that is, having some understanding 
about what its limits are: both as conditions of possibility and what it cannot change). 
Philosophy, even if it calls itself moral philosophy, will always remain moribund 
and acquiescent insofar as it never leads to practical theoretical solutions—however 
provisional—that alter the nature of reality insofar as it can and should be altered. 
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